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ABSTRACT
This paper studies factor substitution in one important sector: the nursing home industry.
Specifically, we measure the extent to which nursing homes substitute materials for labor when labor
becomes relatively more expensive. From a policy perspective, factor substitution in this market is
important because materials-intensive methods of care are associated with greater risks of morbidity
and mortality among nursing home residents. Studying longitudinal data from 1991-1998 on nearly
every nursing home in the United States, we use the method of instrumental variables (IV) to address
the potential endogeneity of nursing home wages. The results from the IV models are consistent with
the theory of factor substitution: higher nursing home wages are associated with lower staffing,
greater use of materials (specifically, physical restraints), and a higher proportion of residents with
pressure ulcers. A comparison of OLS and IV results suggests that empirical studies of factor
substitution should take into account unobserved heterogeneity in factor quality.
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Nursing homes choose between labor-intensive and materials-intensive methods 
of providing many types of care, including feeding, incontinence, and wandering.  
Feeding of residents may be labor intensive, as when employees feed residents by hand, 
or materials-intensive, as when feeding tubes are used.  Care of an incontinent patient 
may be labor-intensive, involving regularly scheduled toileting and bladder rehabilitation, 
or materials-intensive, involving urethral catheterization.  Wandering may be countered 
with staff attention, or with the use of materials such as physical restraints and 
psychoactive drugs.   
This paper tests whether increases in wages for nursing home direct care 
providers cause nursing homes to shift away from labor-intensive, and towards more 
materials-intensive, production of care.  Results from this analysis have important 
implications for policy.  The most recent National Nursing Home Survey counted 1.6 
million Americans living in nursing homes in 1999 (National Center for Health Statistics, 
2002).  It has been projected that in the next twenty years, 46 percent of Americans who 
survive to age 65 will use a nursing home at some point in their lives (Spillman and 
Lubitz, 2002).
2    The market for long-term care is large; nursing home expenditures 
totaled $98.9 billion in 2001, which represents 7 percent of national health expenditures 
(National Center for Health Statistics, 2003).  The provision of nursing home care in 
materials-intensive ways is of interest because such methods are associated with greater 
risks of morbidity and mortality (Zinn, 1993; Harrington et al., 1992) and the fact that 
                                                 
2 The odds differ by gender; currently 33 percent of men and 52 percent of women who reach age 65 will 
use a nursing home at some point in their lives (Kemper and Murtaugh, 1991).  Women are much more 
likely to use a nursing home than men because women have longer life expectancies than men and women 
tend to marry older men, leaving them at greater risk of becoming a widow than men’s risk of becoming a 
widower.   3
nursing home residents are among the most vulnerable in society because of their 
deteriorated mental and physical condition and, often, their lack of family to monitor 
nursing home care (Hirth et al., 2000). 
Factor substitution has been studied in hospitals (Jensen and Morrisey, 1986; 
Morrisey and Jensen, 1990), health maintenance organizations (Okunade, 2003), 
physician practices (Escarce and Pauly, 1998), hospital pharmacies (Okunade, 1993), 
dentist offices (Okunade, 1999), and for treatment of depression (Berndt, Frank, and 
McGuire, 1997).  Two previous studies find evidence consistent with factor substitution 
in nursing homes.  Weisbrod (1988, 1998), in the course of studying the differences 
between for-profit and not-for-profit health care providers, speculated that church-
sponsored nursing homes face lower labor costs because their employees are willing to 
work for lower wages and in some cases as volunteers.  He tested this hypothesis using 
data on nursing homes from the 1978 Survey of Institutionalized Persons and consistently 
found that, relative to proprietary nursing homes, church-related nonprofit nursing homes 
used significantly higher quantities of labor.  He also found that although the percentage 
of residents admitted with a prescription for sedatives was roughly equal in for-profit and 
non-profit homes, those in for-profit homes received more than four times as many doses 
of sedative per month.   
Zinn (1993) finds evidence of labor-materials substitution in 1987 
Medicare/Medicaid Automated Certification Survey (MMACS) data.  Specifically, 
higher wages for nursing home workers were associated with greater use of catheters, 
physical restraints, and feeding tubes.     4
A limitation of the cross-sectional data used in these studies is that local wages 
may be correlated with factor quality (i.e. the productivity of nursing home workers); 
nursing homes that employ more productive workers likely pay higher wages.  For this 
reason, we pursue an instrumental variables approach.  A comparison of our OLS and IV 
suggests that it is important for empirical studies of factor substitution to correct for 
unobserved heterogeneity in factor quality. 
The current analysis seeks to improve on the previous literature in the following 
ways.  First, our study uses recent (1991-1998) longitudinal data on nearly every nursing 
home in the United States.  Second, we address the possibility that nursing home wages 
may be correlated with unobserved factor quality by employing IV estimation methods.  
 
1.  Factor Substitution in the Production of Nursing Home Care 
This section describes the process and feasibility of factor substitution in nursing 
homes and presents hypotheses regarding factor substitution in nursing homes.  
In the long run, a profit-maximizing firm chooses the cost-minimizing 
combination of capital (K), labor (L), and materials (M) to produce a given amount of 
output.  However, in the short run, a firm’s capital is fixed, and firms must minimize 
costs of production by adjusting their use of labor and materials.  Assume that v and w are 
the prevailing per-unit costs of materials and labor, respectively. We assume 
that /0 Lw ∂∂ < ; all else equal, an increase in wage rate w will result in less labor L being 
hired. As w rises, there will also be an increase in M as firms substitute materials for 
labor in order to minimize costs. We show this graphically in Figure 1.    5
In Figure 1, the isoquant q1 joins all bundles of labor and materials that can be 
combined to produce a given level of output (e.g., patient-days of nursing home care). 
The slope of the isoquant is equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution (MRTS) 
between labor and materials; specifically, the negative of the ratio of the marginal 
productivity of labor (MPL) and the marginal productivity of materials (MPM).  
The point on the isoquant that a firm will choose is the bundle of materials and 
labor that minimizes cost, illustrated by the point of tangency between the isoquant and 
an isocost line with a slope equal to the ratio of the factor prices.  At this point of 
tangency, the slope of the isoquant (the MRTS) is equal to the negative of the ratio of the 
factor prices: / / LM MPM P w v = .  This condition can be rewritten as  / / LM MPwM P v = , 
which indicates that when a firm has chosen the cost-minimizing mix of materials and 
labor, the last dollar a firm spends on labor and the last dollar a firm spends on materials 
generate equal marginal productivity.  This implies that if wages w rise while the other 
three variables remain constant, a firm will seek to minimize costs by hiring less labor 
and more materials until the familiar condition of  / / LM MPwM P v =  holds given the new 
wage w.   
Assume that point A represents the bundle of labor (L1) and materials (M1) used 
to produce the quantity of output q1.  Next, suppose that wages rise.  The total effect of 
the wage rise can be decomposed into two distinct parts.  The first is the substitution 
effect, which is for the firm to buy more of the input that has become relatively less 
expensive (materials) and less of the input that has become relatively more expensive 
(labor), holding output constant. This effect is shown as the movement along isoquant q1 
from point A to point B – the quantity of labor used by the firm has fallen from L1 to L2,   6
and the quantity of materials used by the firm has risen from M1 to M2.  At point B, the 
cost-minimizing condition is satisfied for the new, higher w.  
The increase in wages also causes an upward shift in the firm’s marginal cost 
curve; the second part of the impact of a rise in wages is the output effect whereby the 
firm produces less output because of the increase in costs. This effect causes the firm to 
employ less of both labor and materials – the quantity of labor falls from L2 to L3 and the 
quantity of capital falls from M2 to M3. Whereas the substitution effect was a shift in 
labor and materials keeping output constant, the output effect is a shift in labor and 
materials to a different level of output; the output effect is represented as the movement 
from point B on the isoquant q1 to point C on the lower isoquant q2.   
Excluding the very unlikely case in which labor is an inferior input (less labor 
hired at higher output levels), it is unambiguous that a rise in wages results in less labor 
being used in production; both the substitution and output effects work in the same 
direction.  We assume that the net effect of a rise in wages is that more materials will be 
used in production; i.e. we assume that the substitution effect dominates the output effect.  
In terms of Figure 1, we assume that M3 > M1.
3   
The theory of factor substitution typically assumes that inputs are perfectly 
homogenous.  However, factor units may differ in quality; that is, workers may differ in 
their productivity.  If so, one might observe cross-sectionally that firms that produce 
using a high ratio of L to M may pay higher wages than firms that produce using a low 
ratio of L to M.
4  The possibility that there may be unobserved heterogeneity in factor 
                                                 
3 In the long run a firm may also alter its level of capital used in production, but we limit our analysis to 
factor substitution in the short run. 
4 Philpot (1970) discusses how unobserved international variation in labor quality creates bias in estimates 
of factor substitution across countries.   7
quality makes it important to seek exogenous variation in factor prices when attempting 
to estimate the extent of factor substitution. 
We next describe how factor substitution operates in nursing homes specifically.  
Nursing homes are staffed in part by registered nurses (RNs) and licensed practical 
nurses (LPNs), but these workers provide little direct patient care. Nurse aides (NAs) 
provide 80 to 90 percent of the direct care to patients (Institute of Medicine, 1996). More 
than 90 percent of NAs are women and three-fourths have not completed high school. 
They earn close to the minimum wage and less than half of them have any employer-
provided health insurance coverage. The labor market for NAs in nursing homes is very 
fluid and is characterized by high turnover (Munroe, 1990). 
The care provided by NAs is non-technical and consists primarily of helping 
residents with activities of daily living (ADLs) such as eating, dressing, bathing, toileting, 
and walking. For several types of such care, nursing homes choose between providing 
care in a relatively labor-intensive manner or in a relatively materials-intensive manner. 
For example, managing incontinence may be labor-intensive, through regularly scheduled 
toileting and bladder rehabilitation, or materials-intensive through urethral catheterization 
(Zinn, 1993).  Nursing homes face a similar decision with respect to feeding residents; 
feeding may be labor-intensive (by hand) or materials-intensive (involving feeding 
tubes).  A third example is monitoring and controlling residents’ behavior.  Homes may 
choose a labor-intensive method through constant monitoring, or they may choose 
materials-intensive methods such as physical or chemical restraints.  
In some cases, the resident or a third-party payer shoulders some of the costs of 
materials-intensive care.  For example, in some states nursing homes receive a higher   8
Medicaid reimbursement for tube-fed patients (Mitchell et al., 2003).  Prescription drugs 
must be paid for by homes out of the Medicare per diem, but Medicaid pays a discounted 
price for drugs on a per-drug basis, and private payers pay the nondiscounted price of the 
drug (Mendelson et al., 2002).  This may lead economists to ask why nursing homes do 
not minimize costs by reducing staffing and putting all residents on feeding tubes and 
psychoactive drugs.
5  It may be due to a sense of humaneness or fear of lawsuits, but 
answering that question is outside the scope of this paper; our focus is whether a rise in 
the price of labor, holding constant the price of materials, leads homes to substitute 
materials for labor. 
Unlike hospital care that is predominantly provided by nonprofit facilities, 
roughly two-thirds of all nursing homes are for-profit facilities.  Thus, nursing homes 
have strong incentives to choose the cost-minimizing combination of inputs in the 
production of care.  Moreover, labor costs represent 60-70 percent of all nursing home 
costs, implying that homes have a strong incentive to quickly change their factor mix 
after labor becomes more expensive (Zinn, 1993).  There is a high rate of turnover among 
NAs (Institute of Medicine, 1996), so nursing homes can quickly decrease the size of 
their staff simply by slowing the rate at which they replace departing staff members. 
Homes do not have complete freedom in choosing the amount of labor used in 
production; minimum staffing laws impose constraints.  The federal government requires 
that Medicaid and Medicare certified nursing homes have licensed practical nurses 
(LPNs) on duty 24 hours a day; a registered nurse (RN) on duty at least 8 hours a day, 7 
days a week and an RN director of nursing in place (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, 
                                                 
5 In our sample, only 0.04 percent of homes had all of their residents on feeding tubes and only 0.37 percent 
had all their residents on psychoactive drugs.   9
1987). In some states, there are further legal limits on the minimum number of RNs and 
other nurses that must staff a nursing home (Institute of Medicine, 1996). These 
minimum staffing requirements prevent nursing homes that are at or close to the 
minimums from significantly altering their factor mix, and will cause attenuation bias in 
our results. 
Substitution of materials-intensive methods of care for labor-intensive methods of 
care is of interest because materials-intensive methods of care in nursing homes are 
typically associated with a greater risk of morbidity and mortality. Urethral 
catheterization places the resident at greater risk for urinary tract infection; other long-
term complications include bladder and renal stones, abcesses, and renal failure.  Feeding 
tubes can result in complications including self-extubation, infections, aspiration, 
unintended misplacement of the tube, and pain. Immobility resulting from the use of 
physical restraints may increase the risk of pressure ulcers, depression, mental and 
physical deterioration, and mortality (Zinn, 1993).  Psychotropic drugs may also result in 
mental and physical deterioration (Harrington et al., 1992). 
Microeconomic models of factor substitution assume that quality of the output 
good is held constant, but for the reasons just described, in nursing homes a change in the 
input mix may change the quality of care.  Under the conditions of perfect information, 
perfect rationality, costless mobility, and privately purchased care, one would predict that 
residents would respond to a decrease in nursing home quality by departing for a higher-
quality nursing home.  However, consumers in the nursing home market tend to be poorly 
informed, many are cognitively impaired, and many are without relatives to help them 
make decisions.  Grabowski and Hirth (2003) find results consistent with nursing home   10
markets operating under conditions of asymmetric information that can lead to the 
delivery of suboptimal levels of quality.
6  Residents whose nursing home care is paid for 
by Medicaid may face great search costs in finding another nursing home that will accept 
them.  In general, moving between nursing homes can be very costly in time and effort, 
and although such transfers do occur, they are relatively uncommon (Hirth et al., 2000).  
Further, nursing homes cannot directly increase output prices to recoup higher costs 
incurred for care under these primarily prospective payment systems.  Medicaid and 
Medicare are the primary payers for a majority of nursing homes, and payment rates are 
revised only periodically to reflect changes in input prices (GAO, 2003).  All of these 
features of nursing home markets make it possible for nursing homes to adjust factor 
inputs and lower quality with few repercussions in terms of volume or revenue. 
Our specific hypotheses regarding the effect of higher wages on the production of 
nursing home care are as follows. 
Hypothesis 1.  Increases in local wages for nursing home workers result in 
nursing homes employing fewer workers.  We predict that homes will employ both fewer 
NAs and fewer professional nurses (LPNs and RNs). 
  Hypothesis 2. Increases in local wages for nursing home workers cause nursing 
homes to provide care in materials-intensive ways.  As the wage rate for nursing home 
workers increases, nursing homes will look to substitute away from labor and towards 
materials such as catheters, feeding tubes, physical restraints, and psychoactive drugs.  
                                                 
6 Chou (2002) finds that differences in the quality of care between not-for-profit and for-profit nursing 
homes are greater among residents who lack information about the quality of nursing home care (defined as 
residents who did not have a spouse or child visit them within a month after admission) than among those 
with better information (defined as residents who had a spouse or child visit them).   11
Hypothesis 3. Increases in local wages for nursing home workers are associated 
with a rise in indicators of low quality of care in nursing homes.  We predict that the 
prevalence of pressure ulcers (which are commonly termed bedsores) will rise after the 
wages of nursing home workers rise. 
 
2. The Online Survey Certification and Reporting System (OSCAR) Data 
This study uses a longitudinal data set: the linked annual data of the federal 
Online Survey Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) system from 1991 through 1998 for 
the 48 contiguous United States (excluding Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of 
Columbia). The OSCAR system contains information from state surveys of all federally 
certified Medicaid nursing facilities and Medicare skilled nursing care homes in the U.S. 
Almost 96 percent of all facilities nationwide are federally certified (Strahan, 1997) so 
the OSCAR system includes the vast majority of nursing homes in the U.S. Collected and 
maintained by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the OSCAR data 
are used to determine whether homes are complying with federal regulations. Every 
facility is required to have an initial survey to verify compliance. Thereafter, states are 
required to resurvey each facility at least every 15 months; in practice, the average is 
about 12 months (Harrington et al., 1998).   
Although many of the elements in the OSCAR system are self-reported by the 
facilities, the data are generally considered accurate and reliable (Harrington et al. 2000).  
The OSCAR data have been recommended for more extensive use by a recent IOM 
expert panel on nursing home quality (IOM 2001).  Our sample includes 121,627   12
complete surveys from 18,220 nursing homes conducted between 1991 and 1998 within 
the 48 contiguous states. 
Summary statistics for the sample are contained in Table 1.  The average home 
uses 2.15 Nurse Aide hours per resident day and 1.22 professional (i.e. LPN and/or RN) 
hours per resident day.  The average home in the sample has 8.3 percent of residents with 
a catheter, 6.1 percent with a feeding tube, 18 percent under restraints, 38 percent on at 
least one psychoactive drug, and 7.2 percent of residents with pressure ulcers.  The 
OSCAR files are supplemented with data from several sources. Data on the wages of 
nursing home workers is from the Covered Employment and Wages data collected by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  Table 1 indicates that the average state-level hourly 
wage of all nursing home workers is $8.19 (wages have been converted to 1998 dollars).  
Data on the costs of materials (pharmaceuticals, plastics and rubber) come from the BLS 
Producer Price Index.  Aggregate county level demographic data are taken from the 
Bureau of Health Professions’ Area Resource File (ARF).  We also merge with the 
OSCAR data on the effective minimum wage rate law for each state and year. All 
variables expressed in dollars are converted to 1998 dollars using the BLS consumer 
price index. 
 
3. Empirical Methods 
3.1. Basic Model 
We initially use OLS to estimate the following reduced-form regression of the 
relationship between the cost of labor and outcomes related to factor substitution: 
HT H TW TV T H TX H T YW V T X β ββ β ε =+ + ++              (1)   13
The dependent variable, HT Y , represents one of several outcomes of interest at 
nursing homeH at timeT .  The first set of dependent variables measures the quantity of 
labor used in production.  There are two such outcomes of interest: the number of NA 
hours per resident day, and the number of professional nurse (RN and LPN) hours per 
resident day, employed by the facility.  We predict that the sign of  W β , the coefficient on 
the real wages of nursing home workers, will be negative when the dependent variable 
measures the quantity of labor used in nursing home production. 
The second set of dependent variables measures the extent of materials-intensive 
care.  There are four such outcomes of interest: the proportion of residents in the facility 
with catheters, tube feedings, physical restraints, or on psychoactive drugs
7.  We predict 
that the sign of the coefficient on nursing home worker wages will be positive when the 
dependent variable measures the extent of materials-intensive care. 
The final dependent variable measures the quality of care; specifically: the 
proportion of residents with pressure ulcers.  Pressure ulcers (or decubitis ulcers), 
commonly associated with immobility, are areas of the skin and underlying tissues that 
erode as a result of pressure or friction and/or lack of blood supply. Pressure ulcers have 
been found to be associated with an increased rate of mortality (Brandeis et al., 1990). 
Pressure ulcers are a particularly good measure of quality because they are preventable 
and treatable conditions (Kane et al., 1989).  We predict that the sign of the coefficient on 
nursing home worker wages will be positive when the dependent variable measures the 
quality of care. 
                                                 
7 Psychoactive medications encompass antipsychotic, antianxiety, antidepressant, and hypnotic 
medications.    14
For each of the outcomes represented as a percentage of residents, we use the 







A  where  i P  
represents the proportion of residents of nursing home i.  Because the logit transformation 
assigns no value when the percent is equal to either zero or one, zero values were recoded 
as .001 and values of one were recoded as .999.
8  In each regression, observations are 
weighted according to the number of residents in nursing home H  at timeT . 
Among the independent variables in equation (1),  HT W is the real wage of nursing 
home workers in the local labor market of nursing homeH at timeT .  For each state, we 
use the average state-level quarterly wage associated with Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code 805: Nursing and Personal Care Facilities Employees. This 
category includes employees in skilled nursing care facilities, intermediate care facilities, 
and nursing and personal care facilities not classified in the first two categories. This 
classification excludes employees in medical offices and clinics, hospitals, medical and 
dental laboratories, home health care, and outpatient facilities.
9   
We measure factor substitution as wages rise holding constant the cost of 
materials.  In equation (1),  T V is a vector of variables that measure of the cost of materials 
at timeT .  The variables included in that vector are the same variables that the Centers 
                                                 
8 Prior to this recoding, 9.01 percent of the home-year observations in our sample had 0 percent of residents 
on catheters while 0.04 percent had 100 percent of residents on catheters.  Similarly, 10.21 percent of 
homes had 0 percent of residents under physical restraints and only 0.10 percent had 100 percent of 
residents under restraints.  21.86 percent of observations had 0 percent of residents on feeding tubes and 
only 0.04 percent had all residents on feeding tubes.  2.34 percent of observations had 0 percent of residents 
on antipsychotic drugs and only 0.37 percent had all residents on such drugs.  8.92 percent of observations 
had 0 percent of residents with pressure ulcers and 0.03 percent had all residents with pressure sores. 
9 We also estimated our models using the county-level wage, but this is measured at the 2-digit SIC code 
level.  SIC code 80 includes not only nursing home workers but also all workers in medical offices, clinics, 
hospitals, medical and dental laboratories.  Our estimates using the 2-digit SIC measure were generally not 
supportive of our hypotheses, we suspect because it is an inaccurate measure of the wages of nursing home 
workers.    15
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) uses to track changes over time in the costs 
of hospitals and nursing homes using the Hospital Input Price Index and the Skilled 
Nursing Facility Price Index.  Specifically, we use the Producer Price Index for the 
components Pharmaceuticals and Plastics & Rubber.  The cost of materials is assumed to 
be uniform nationally at a particular point in time. 
T  is a linear time trend, and X is a vector of control variables.  At the home level, 
we include an index for activities of daily living to control for the underlying case-mix 
within the facility. This index is equal to the average number of activities of daily living 
(ADLs) with which residents need assistance, which reflects the average dependence of 
the residents in each facility.  ADLs form the cornerstone of nursing home resident 
classification and play a major role in all state-level Medicaid case-mix adjustment 
payment systems.  Total number of certified beds, profit status (for-profit, not-for-profit 
and government), hospital-affiliation and whether the home is part of a multiple-facility 
chain are also included as facility-level control variables. 
   A Herfindahl index is included to control for the competitiveness of the county 
nursing home market.
10  The population of individuals over age 75 per square mile in the 
county, and the real median income in the county, are also included as regressors.  Given 
the importance of Medicaid as a payer of nursing home services (Grabowski, 2001), we 
also controlled for the real average state Medicaid payment rate. 
Our data is a census of Federally-certified nursing homes, and as such, the point 
estimates of the coefficients could be interpreted as their true values; by this 
interpretation, standard errors are not informative and tests of statistical significance are 
                                                 
10 This index is constructed by summing the squared market shares of all nursing home facilities in the 
county. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with a higher value signifying a greater concentration of facilities.   16
unnecessary.  However, standard errors are meaningful if one interprets the sample 
(which covers 1991-1998) as drawn from all possible years.  For readers who wish to see 
tests of statistical significance, we provide standard errors and indicators of when p 
values meet the thresholds of traditional levels of statistical significance.   
We adjust the standard errors for two types of correlation in error terms across 
observations.  First, the “grouped” nature of the data (i.e. multiple observations from each 
home) may introduce heteroskedasticity and bias the estimates of the parameter standard 
errors, so we cluster-correct standard errors to account for the correlation within homes 
over time.  Second, we adjust the standard errors to account for the fact that we are 
regressing individual nursing home outcomes on a regressor of interest (nursing home 
wages) that varies only by state and quarter.  As a result of regressing micro outcomes on 
an aggregate regressor, unadjusted standard errors will be biased downwards, perhaps 
dramatically.
11  We adjust for this by bootstrapping the standard errors, selecting with 
replacement all observations by particular state and quarter.
12  As expected, this 
adjustment considerably increases the standard errors.   
3.2. Instrumental Variables Model 
One concern with the OLS model is that variation in labor costs may be correlated 
with variation in factor quality (i.e. nursing home worker productivity).  For example, 
states with more productive nursing home workers will also likely have higher nursing 
home wages.  Such unobserved heterogeneity will bias the OLS coefficients on nursing 
                                                 
11 Moulton (1990).  Donald and Lang (2001) and Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) discuss this 
problem as it applies to the standard errors of difference-in-differences estimators. 
12 We conduct 50 replications to estimate the bootstrap standard errors, which is in the range recommended 
by Efron and Tibshirani (1993).     17
home worker wages. To address this problem, we estimate a model of instrumental 
variables.   
Equation (2) shows that nursing home wages W may also be related to the 
variables X ,V , and T from equation (1).  Nursing home wages may also be a function 
ofZ , a set of variables uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage regression.  
The variable ν  represents the residual. 
    HT HT Z HT X T V T HT WZ X V T λ λλ λ ν =+ + + +                     (2)  
  A key econometric issue is that nursing home wages W may be correlated 
with HT ε , the error term in the second-stage regression.  Changes over time in local wage 
rates for nursing home workers may be correlated with changes in the demand for labor-
intensive nursing home care.  In these cases, the error terms ε  and ν  will be correlated, 
which violates the assumptions underlying the linear regression model.  
We can generate consistent estimates of the effect of nursing home wages on our 
outcomes of interest if we can identify a set of variablesZ that are correlated with nursing 
home wages but not ε , the error term in the second-stage regression. GivenZ , we can 
calculate an IV estimate of the effect of nursing homes wages on the outcomes of interest.   
We identify two plausible instruments for the wages of nursing home workers.  
The first is the effective real minimum wage in the state.  The effective minimum wage is 
the state’s own legislated minimum unless the federal minimum is greater, in which case 
the federal minimum wage is the state’s effective minimum wage.  Nursing homes are 
primarily staffed by nurse aides who tend to be paid at or near the minimum wage 
(Institute of Medicine, 1996), so a change in the effective minimum wage rate represents 
an exogenous shock to nursing home wages (Machin, Manning, and Rahman, 2002).   18
Over the period 1991 to 1998, there were 17 instances in which states changed their 
effective minimum wage relative to the federal minimum wage. There were also two 
changes in the federal minimum wage over our period of study; the minimum wage 
increased from $4.25 to $4.75 in 1996 and from $4.75 to the current level of $5.15 in 
1997.  We assume that such changes are uncorrelated with worker productivity and 
uncorrelated with the demand for labor-intensive nursing home care.   
Our second instrument is the state wage rate for similar workers in a non-health 
care industry; the correlation between wages in the two sectors identifies local wage 
shocks for a given skill level of worker that are uncorrelated with nursing home worker 
productivity or with the demand for labor-intensive nursing home care.  Specifically, our 
second instrument is the average state real wage for Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code 53: General Merchandise Stores; this SIC code includes employees in 
department stores, variety stores and miscellaneous general merchandise stores. This 
wage rate is likely to be correlated with nurse aide wages because, as stated in a 1996 
Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, “wages of nursing assistants are generally near the 
minimum wage and are comparable to levels offered by fast food chains and retail 
establishments” (p. 160). The IOM committee “heard reports of NAs leaving health care 
for retail jobs when a K-Mart opened” (p. 263).  In Section 5: Robustness Checks, we 
describe that our results are largely robust to the use of wages from other sectors as 
instruments.  
Tests of overidentification are often used to determine the validity of instruments 
by testing whether the IV coefficient estimated one instrument is similar to the IV 
coefficient estimated using another instrument that is assumed to be valid.  A weakness   19
of overidentification tests is that two valid instruments may have different marginal 
effects and one may incorrectly conclude based on an overidentification test that an 
instrument is invalid.  For example, the minimum wage is not binding in high-wage-
paying nursing homes, but all homes may be affected by wages offered to their workers 
by the retail sector; for this reason, the two instruments may have different marginal 
effects.  Overidentification tests (Sargan, 1958) indicate that our instruments seem to 
have similar effects in the staffing regressions, but different effects in the regressions 
concerning materials-intensive care.  Given that the effective minimum wage and the 
wages in other sectors are very unlikely to be affected by nursing home decisions about 
methods of care, we believe that both instruments are valid, and that the results of the 
overidentification test reflect the fact that the instruments have different marginal effects. 
The identifying assumption is that the effective minimum wage and wages for 
general merchandise store employees are correlated withW , the nursing home wage rate, 
but are uncorrelated withε , the error term in the second-stage regression. In the first 
stage of IV estimation (Eq.3), the nursing home wage is regressed on these instruments 
plus the other regressors ( X ,V , and T ) from the second stage of IV estimation. In the 
second stage, the various outcomes of interest are regressed on the instrumented nursing 
home wage rate and the other regressors  X ,V , and T . The IV analyses are weighted by 
the number of facility residents and the standard errors reflect Huber-White corrections 
for intra-home correlation.  
Bound et al. (1995) argue that the use of instruments that explain little of the 
variation in the endogenous variable can do more harm than good. If a set of instruments 
is weakly correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, then even a small   20
correlation between the instruments and the error term in the second-stage regression can 
seriously bias estimates.  Their results suggest that the partial R
2 and F-statistics on the 
excluded instruments in the first-stage regression are useful as rough guides to the quality 
of the IV estimates. Staiger and Stock (1997) argue that 10 is an acceptable value of the 
F-statistic associated with the hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments in the 
first-stage regression are jointly equal to zero (Stock and Yogo, 2002).
13  
The set of instruments far exceeds the minimum standard of Staiger and Stock . In 
the first stage of IV estimation, the hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are 
jointly equal to zero is rejected. Appendix Table 1 indicates that in the first-stage 
regression, the instruments have an F-statistic equal to 185.05 and ∆R
2 = 0.06. The first-
stage coefficients on the instruments are of the expected sign. Both the minimum wage 
and the general merchandising store wage are positively correlated with nursing home 
wages. Each of these instruments is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
IV raises standard errors, and this loss of efficiency should only be incurred if 
something is gained in terms of consistency.  A Hausman test is one piece of evidence as 
to whether OLS estimates are inconsistent.  Testing both instruments, we reject at the 1 
percent level the null hypothesis of OLS consistency only for the professional staffing 
measure.  If we test each instrument separately, we reject the null for professional staffing 
when we use the manufacturing wage as the instrument, and we reject the null for 
physical restraints and psychoactive drugs when we use minimum wage as the 
                                                 
13 More recent work by Stock and Yogo (2002) has argued that this Staiger-Stock rule of thumb is 
somewhat general in that the strength of the instrument depends on the inferential task to which the 
instruments are applied and how that inference is conducted. The authors propose a more detailed set of F-
statistics to account for different estimators and the number of endogenous regressors. Given our use of 
least squares with only one endogenous regressor, we will use the Staiger-Stock rule of thumb. 
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instrument.  Although these Hausman test results suggest that only for certain outcomes 
is the OLS coefficient inconsistent, the failure to reject the null hypothesis should not be 
confused with confirmation of the null.  Moreover, there is a reason to believe that OLS 
coefficients are inconsistent: there likely exists heterogeneity in factor quality, and when 
homes employ higher-productivity workers they may pay higher wages.  The difference 
in point estimates between OLS and IV (even though often not statistically significant) 
and the likelihood that unobserved factor quality affects OLS results suggest that IV 
estimation offers gains in consistency that are worth the loss in efficiency. 
The second part of the identifying assumption is that the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage regression.  Although it is impossible 
to confirm the null hypothesis that they are uncorrelated, examining whether the 
instruments are strongly correlated with observable factors can be informative 
(McClellan, McNeil, and Newhouse, 1994).  To this end, the sample was divided in two: 
observations for which the effective minimum wage was above the mean for the sample 
and observations for which it was below the mean for the sample.  This process was 
repeated but with the division occurring on the basis of whether the general merchandise 
store wage was above or below the sample mean.  Appendix Table 2 lists the means of 
the variables used in this study by group, and indicates with asterisks whether the 
differences in the means of the groups are statistically significant. 
Appendix Table 2 is divided into three sections.  The first is devoted to nursing 
home worker wages, the second to explanatory variables, and the third to outcome 
variables.  The first section indicates that homes in states with above-average minimum 
wages pay on average 40 cents more per hour.  Homes in states with above-average   22
manufacturing wages pay on average $1.22 more per hour.  These are consistent with the 
assumption that the instruments are correlated with the potentially endogenous regressor. 
The second section of the table presents means of the explanatory variables for 
the two groups.  In general, the means of the variables are similar for the observations 
associated with above-average and below-average values of the instrument; however, 
given the large sample, the difference in means is usually statistically significant.  The 
largest differences in means occur between those above and below the average 
manufacturing wage for the following variables: number of beds, hospital-based, 
Herfindahl Index, per capita income, and elderly per square mile.  It should be noted that 
the group means in this table are unconditional. 
The outcome variables occupy the bottom section of Appendix Table 2.  There are 
only slight differences between homes with high values of the instruments with those 
with low values of the instruments.  This comparison represents a preliminary and 
unconditional IV estimate of the effect of wages on the outcomes.   
In summary, the instruments used in this study appear to be strongly correlated 
with the endogenous regressor.  Although the difference in observables between homes 
with high and low values of the instruments are usually statistically significant, the size 
of the difference is often small.   
 
4. Empirical Results 
Empirical results from fourteen regressions are presented in Table 2.  
Bootstrapped standard errors are presented in parentheses below the estimated 
coefficients.  There are seven outcomes of interest, and column 1 contains results from   23
OLS and column 2 contains those from IV models.  For each outcome and method of 
estimation, we report the coefficient on nursing home wages, the t statistic associated 
with that coefficient, and the elasticity of that outcome with respect to changes in wages. 
 
4.1. OLS Results 
  We hypothesize that higher wages result in lower staffing, greater use of 
materials, and a rise in pressure ulcers.  The OLS results in column 1 of Table 2 provide 
some support for these hypotheses.  The point estimates indicate that higher wages are 
associated with fewer NAs and professional staffing. However, only the NA result is 
statistically significant. A 10 percent increase in nursing home wages is associated with 
0.65 percent fewer NAs. Also consistent with our hypotheses, homes facing higher wages 
tend to have a greater proportion of their residents on physical restraints and a greater 
proportion of residents with pressure ulcers.  The coefficient on feeding tubes is of the 
expected sign, but not statistically significant.   
The coefficients on catheters and psychoactive drugs were not of the expected 
sign.  Two Registered Nurses have pointed out to us that they believe that catheters are a 
complement, not a substitute, for nurse labor, given the need for nurse time to insert and 
supervise the catheter.  Our results are consistent with their claim; higher nurse wages are 
associated with a smaller percentage of residents with catheters and the correlation is 
statistically significant.  A 10 percent increase in nursing home wages is associated with 
3.4 percent fewer residents with catheters. 
  Although these results show some support for Zinn’s earlier cross-sectional 
estimates, the mixed results may reflect heterogeneity in factor quality.  For example,   24
when average nursing home worker productivity rises in a state, it is likely that nursing 
home worker wages also rise.  To address this problem, we estimate IV models. 
   
4.2 Instrumental Variables Results 
  The results from the IV models are presented in column 2 of Table 2. In general, 
the IV estimates provide stronger support for the predictions derived from the model of 
factor substitution. The coefficients on nursing home worker wages are negative, as 
predicted, in both the nurse aide and professional nurse regressions.  However, while the 
coefficient is significant in the professional nurse regression, it fails to meet the 10 
percent significance level in the NA regression.  We find that a 10 percent increase in the 
wages of nursing home workers is associated with a 3.2 percent decline in professional 
staffing. 
The IV estimates also support the hypothesis that higher wages will lead to 
increasingly materials-intensive provision of care. For example, a rise in wages of 10 
percent is associated with an 8.7 percent rise in the number of residents under physical 
restraints.
14  The coefficients on wages in the feeding tubes and psychoactive drugs 
regressions are positive, as predicted, but they are not statistically significant. 
The IV results also confirm that higher wages are associated with more pressure 
ulcers; specifically, a 10 percent increase in the wages of nursing home workers is 
associated with a 6.5 percent increase in the number of residents with pressure ulcers.   
                                                 
14 In regressions in which the outcome of interest is a percentage, and the dependent variable has been logit 
transformed, the elasticity is calculated as:  (1 ) p X εβ = −  where  p is the average outcome of interest in 
the sample, β is the coefficient on the wage of nursing home workers, and  X is the average wage of 
nursing home workers in the sample.   25
The IV point estimates on nursing home worker wages in the catheter use 
regression are opposite to our prediction but are consistent with the claim that catheters 
are complements with nurse time.  However, the coefficient is not statistically significant.   
In general, the IV point estimates are larger in absolute magnitude than those from 
OLS.  The contrast between the IV and OLS results is consistent with time-varying 
unobserved heterogeneity in factor quality that is correlated with factor prices.  Of 
course, it does not prove the existence of such unobserved heterogeneity, it is merely 
consistent with it.  Variation in average nursing home worker productivity in a state may 
be correlated with average nursing home worker wages in a state.  For the purposes of 
this paper, we are agnostic about what causes changes over time in factor quality.   
In summary, the IV results support our three hypotheses. The wage coefficient is 
of the expected sign in six of the seven models and three of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. 
 
5. Extensions and Robustness Checks 
We conducted the following robustness checks of these results.  First, because our 
measures of the cost of materials are nationwide and annual, it is not possible to use 
indicator variables for year when also controlling for the cost of materials; instead, a time 
trend is included.  In order to test whether our results are due to the failure to include 
indicator variables for year, we re-estimated our models dropping the cost of materials 
and adding a set of indicator variables for year.  The results were robust. 
Second, we were concerned that the mix of payers for nursing home residents 
may influence the results.  In the previous results in this paper, we excluded as regressors   26
the percent of nursing home residents whose stay was paid by Medicare and the percent 
paid by Medicaid, out of the concern that the labor-materials mix of care was 
simultaneously determined with payer type.  As a robustness check, we re-estimated the 
models of this paper controlling for the percent of residents in the home whose stay was 
paid by Medicare, and the percent paid by Medicaid, and found no meaningful changes in 
the results.  
Third, we re-estimated our IV models using as instruments wages from other 
occupations and sectors, including those related to health (SIC 808: home health care, 
SIC 806: hospitals, and SIC 801: offices and clinics of doctors of medicine) and sectors 
unrelated to health (SIC 581: eating and drinking places, and SIC 701: hotels and motels).  
We found that the results in the Nurse Aide, feeding tube, catheter, and bedsore 
regressions were remarkably robust to the choice of instrument.  For the other outcomes 
of interest, professional staffing, restraints, and psychoactive drugs, results are generally 
robust to the choice of wages from health sectors as instruments, but are generally not 
robust to the choice of wages from a non-health sector as instruments. 
Fourth, we experimented with dropping hospital-based nursing homes from our 
sample. This did not substantially affect our estimates. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  This paper measures the extent of factor substitution in the nursing home industry 
by estimating IV models using longitudinal data from 1991-1998 on nearly every nursing 
home in the United States.  We find that a 10 percent increase in nursing home worker 
wages is associated with a 3.2 percent decrease in professional nurse staffing, an 8.7   27
percent increase in the percentage of residents who are physically restrained, and a 6.5 
percent increase in the percentage of residents who suffer from pressure sores. 
  The implications of these results extend beyond nursing homes.  Buerhaus, 
Staiger, and Auerbach (2000) document a decline over the past twenty years in the 
number of younger women entering the nursing profession and predict that unless the 
trend is reversed the RN workforce will decline nearly 20 percent below projected 
workforce requirements by 2020.  Ceteris paribus, this decrease in the supply of nurses 
will lead to higher wages.  Policymakers should anticipate that health care providers will 
react to such a rise in nurse wages by substituting away from nurse labor and toward 
other inputs.  If the other input is physician labor, there may be no adverse effects for 
patients, but if providers substitute towards lower-skilled staff, materials or capital, 
patients may experience a lower quality of care.  A number of studies have already 
implicated low RN staffing as a source of adverse outcomes, including increased risk of 
mortality, experienced by medical and surgical patients (see Buerhaus et. al, 2002 for a 
discussion of this literature). 
Given evidence that materials-intensive methods of care are associated with 
higher morbidity and mortality among residents, policymakers may wish to limit the 
flexibility of nursing homes to substitute materials for labor.  In particular, policymakers 
may wish to combine minimum staffing standards with indexing of Medicaid payment 
rates to local labor market conditions so that homes with higher labor costs would receive 
higher Medicaid payments.  Such indexing must be combined with minimum staffing 
requirements; otherwise homes in high-wage areas could pocket any additional Medicaid 
payment and continue to choose the factor mix that minimizes total costs.     28
This research also contributes to the broader economic literature on factor 
substitution. We offer a framework for addressing the possible endogeneity of wages that 
future work can extend to the study of factor substitution in other industries.  Our 
findings suggest that empirical studies of factor substitution must consider the possibility 
of unobserved heterogeneity in factor quality and use methods like instrumental variables 
to generate consistent estimates of the effect of changing factor prices on the factor mix 
employed in production.   29
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of OSCAR data (N=121,627) 
 
Variable Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
Nurse Aides Hours per Resident Day  2.15 1.47  0  24 
Professional Nurse Hours per Resident Day  1.22 1.22  0  16 
% Residents with Catheter  0.083 0.089  0.0001  0.9999 
% Residents with Feeding Tube  0.061 0.080  0.0001  0.9999 
% Residents with Restraints  0.18 0.16  0.0001  0.9999 
% Residents with Psychoactive Drugs  0.38 0.18  0.0001  0.9999 
% Residents with Pressure Ulcers  0.072 0.068  0.0001  0.9999 
Average Hourly Wage of SIC 805 in State ($1998)  8.19 1.47 5.24 13.48 
For-profit  0.67 0.47  0  1 
Non-profit  0.27 0.44  0  1 
Number of Beds  107.67 78.20  1  9,309 
Hospital-Based  0.11 0.31  0  1 
Chain  0.51 0.50  0  1 
ADL Index  3.81 0.61  0  5 
Herfindahl Index  0.21 0.24  0  1 
Per Capita Income ($1998) 
23,062.55 5,887.44 6,225.60 72,194.00 
Elderly (65+) Per Square Mile  137.45 421.99  0.03  7,036.11 
Average State Medicaid Payment Rate ($1998)  86.06 20.83 50.53 163.10 
Producer Price Index – Pharmaceuticals  269.12 8.41 260.06  290.10 
Producer Price Index – Plastics & Rubber  154.70 8.53 139.20  170.06 
Effective Minimum Wage ($1998)  4.95 0.25 4.55  6.00 
Average Hourly Wage of SIC 53 in State ($1998)  7.57 0.98 5.10 12.26 
Year  1994.53 2.26  1991  1998   34
 
Table 2: Evidence of Factor Substitution 
Nursing Home Wage Coefficients, (standard errors), and elasticities 
N=121,627 
 
Dependent Variable  1  2 




NAs Per Resident Day  -0.0168*  -0.031 
 (0.0086)  (0.019) 
  ε= -.065  ε= -.118 
    
RNs and LPNs per   -0.0046  -0.048*** 
Resident Day  (0.0061)  (0.010) 
  ε= -.031  ε= -.322 
    
Catheters -0.0445***  -0.025 
 (0.0114)  (0.018) 
  ε= -.338  ε= -.188 
    
Feeding Tubes  0.026  0.019 
 (0.023)  (0.041) 
  ε= .200  ε= .146 
    
Physical Restraints  0.069***  0.135** 
 (0.023)  (0.055) 
  ε= .463  ε= .873 
    
Psychoactive Drugs  -0.011  0.0040 
 (0.012)  (0.0245) 
  ε= -.056  ε= .020 
    
Pressure Ulcers  0.059***  0.085*** 
 (0.012)  (0.021) 
  ε= .448  ε= .646 
 
Notes:  
1) * = statistically significant at 10% level; ** = statistically significant at the 5% level;  
*** = statistically significant at the 1% level. 
2) Standard errors are bootstrapped, with clustering by state-quarter.  From each bootstrapped sample, the 
regression is estimated with standard errors cluster-corrected at the nursing home level. 
3) The other regressors in each regression are: number of beds, Herfindahl Index for the nursing home 
market, an index of the number of Activities of Daily Living with which residents need assistance, real 
county per capita income, number of elderly residents in county per square mile, the real state-level 
Medicaid payment rate, the producer price index for pharmaceuticals, the producer price index for plastics 
& rubber, year, and indicator variables for whether the nursing home is non-profit, part of a chain, or based 
in a hospital.    35
 
Appendix Table 1: First Stage of IV Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Wage of Nursing Home Workers ($1998) 
 
Regressor Coefficient  and   
(t Statistic) 
Effective Minimum Wage ($1998)  0.28 
(3.06) 






Nursing home beds  0.000066 
(1.29) 




Average ADLs  0.011 
(0.87) 
Herfindahl Index  -0.25 
(-6.13) 
Per capita income ($1998)  0.000021 
(12.56) 
Population Age 65+ per square mile  -0.00005 
(-2.92) 




Year trend  0.040 
(3.92) 
PPI for Pharmaceuticals  0.003 
(0.70) 








2 associated with the instruments  0.06 
F-statistic of instruments  185.05 
Number of observations  121,627 
Notes:  
1)  Regressions are weighted by the total number of residents in each facility. 
2)  T statistics reflect standard errors Huber-White adjusted for correlation in the error terms within 
state and quarter.   36
Appendix Table 2: 
Comparison of Observables by Value of Instrument 
 
    













            
Nursing Home Wage Rate    8.24  8.64
** 7.77  8.99
** 
          
Explanatory Variables 
          
For-profit   0.68  0.67
** 0.66  0.69
** 
Non-profit   0.25  0.26
** 0.26  0.25
** 
Number of Beds    150.73  151.32  142.16  159.23
** 
Hospital-Based   0.055  0.055  0.055  0.055 
Chain   0.50  0.50  0.53  0.48
** 
ADL Index    3.86  3.76
** 3.83  3.82
** 
Herfindahl Index    0.19  0.18
** 0.23  0.14
** 
Per Capita Income    23,235  24,709
** 22,299  25,249
** 
Elderly per sq mile    221.19  207.72
** 116.25  309.17
** 
State Medicaid Payment Rate    87.93  91.51
** 84.45  93.96
** 
PPI – Pharmaceuticals    268.03  270.55
** 268.64  269.40
** 
PPI – Plastics & Rubber    155.40  153.82
** 155.02  154.54
** 
          
Outcomes 
          
Nurse Aides Hours     2.03  2.00
** 2.04  2.00
** 
Professional Nurse Hours    0.97  0.99
** 0.98  0.98
* 
% with Catheter    0.077  0.072
** 0.076  0.74
** 
% with Feeding Tube    0.062  0.062  0.061  0.063
** 
% with Restraints    0.21  0.16
** 0.19  0.19
** 
% with Psychoactive Drugs    0.37  0.40
** 0.38  0.38
** 
% with Bedsores    0.070  0.067
** 0.066  0.072
** 
            
Number of observations    72,786  48,841  61,447  60,180 
 
Notes:  
1) The means are weighted by the total number of residents in each facility. 
2) 
* = Difference in means is statistically significant at 5% level; 
** = Difference in means is statistically 
significant at 1% level 
 